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LAND-BASED SEAMAN:
RECOVERY FOR OFF-THE-JOB INJURIES
It was recognized at an early date that the English rule confining
admiralty jurisdiction to the "ebb and flow of the tide"1 would have
to be expanded to meet the demands of the developing transportation
and commerce on our nation's inland waterways.2 Since that time, the
scope of the remedies3 afforded to "seaman"4 for personal injuries has
:'See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). See also
I M. NoR is, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § I (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as NoRRIs].
2See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
At first the Supreme Court followed the English rule limiting admiralty jurisdiction
to tidal waters. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (1o Wheat.) 428 (1825); The
Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (it Pet.) 175 (1837). But in Genesee Chief
the earlier "tidal" cases were overruled and it was asserted that admiralty
jurisdiction extended to the navigable lakes and rivers of the United States,
without regard to the ebb and flow of ocean tides. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 443.
The extension of the jurisdiction to all significant interior waters was reaffirmed
in later cases. See The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15 (1868); The Hine v. Trevor,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1866); Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (2o How.)
296 (1858). For a thumbnail sketch of the history of the gradual extension of
admiralty jurisdiction to include navigable rivers see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 28 n.99 (1957) [hereinafter cited as GILMO E & BLACK].
3See generally GILMORE & B.ACK 248-53. For an excellent guide to maritime
employees' remedies see Kolius and Vickery, Maritime Employees' Remedies Against
Employers, 23 ARK. L. RaV. 192 (1969). Maritime workers who can qualify as sea-
men traditionally have been allowed more exclusive remedies than those available
under state workmen's compensation benefits. Seamen may usually recover under
the Jones Act, the Doctrine of Unseaworthiness, and the general maritime rights
to transportation, wages, and maintenance and cure. Id. at 197-8. For a discussion
of the Jones Act see text accompanying notes 32-48 infra.
'See generally 1 NoRsS § it. Although it was once said that a "seaman" was
a person who could "hand, reef and steer," the term has been gradually enlarged
to encompass all individuals who contribute to the operation and welfare of a
ship. The Buena Ventura, 243 F. 797, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). The significance of
whether or not a maritime worker may be a "seaman" is clearly revealed by the
greater variety of remedies available to a seaman. Note 3 supra. The traditional
tests as to when a maritime worker may be a seaman have been: (I) the vessel
with which an individual is connected must be in navigation; (2) the worker
must have more or less permanent connection with the vessel; and (3) the worker
must be aboard the vessel primarily to aid in its navigation. I NoRRus § i, at 31.
Yet recent decisions have challenged these established guidelines. E.g., Grimes v.
Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252 (1958) (per curiam); Senko v. La Crosse
Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957); Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S. 879, rev'g
per curiam, 222 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1955). In all three cases the worker did not
have a permanent connection with his vessel and was not aboard primarily in
aid of navigation. Yet the Supreme Court held that the question of seaman status
was a jury issue and permitted the jury in each instance to find that the worker
was a seaman. Eventually new standards were formulated which required only
that a person (1) perform a substantial part of his duties aboard a vessel, and
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been extended by a more liberal interpretation of those activities con-
sidered to be "in the course of employment." 5 Specifically, recent deci-
(2) that such duties contribute to the function of the vessel. Offshore Co. v. Robi-
son, 266 F.2d 769 (5 th Cir. 1959). For a listing of those watercraft considered"vessels in navigation" see i NoRms § 17.
The flexible interpretation given the word "seaman" generally has been de-
pendent upon the context of the particular remedy under which the term is
sought to be applied. Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934). A strict interpreta-
tion has been applied in the context of the remedy of maintenance and cure.
Generally it has been held that those employees of a vessel in navigation who
are primarily on board to aid in the navigation, and who have a more or less
permanent connection with the ship, are seamen. Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S.
Co., 123 F.2d 991 (ist Cir. 1941); The Buena Ventura, 243 F. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
Yet a seaman's right to maintenance and cure has not been governed by the
duration of the voyage, or whether he sleeps aboard ship or ashore. Weiss v.
Central R.R., 235 F.2d 3o9 (2d Cir. 1956). Whether one injured aboard a vessel
is a seaman entitled to recovery under the Jones Act has been held to be a
question of fact. Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952). Under the
Jones Act the word seaman has been given quite a liberal interpretation. See
Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957); Offshore Co. v. Robison,
266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959); Weiss v. Central R.R., 235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956).
Generally the one standard emphasized in the determination of seaman status
as to the Jones Act is that the worker be aboard primarily to aid in navigation.
See generally 2 M. NoRais THE LAw OF SEAMAN § 659 (2d ed. 1962).
'Workmen's compensation statutes generally provide that employee death or
disability is compensable only if "arising out of and in the course of employment."
See i A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WOmzaSEN's CoMPENSATION § 6.10, at 41-42 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON]. See Oregon Workmen's Compensation Act, ORE.
REv. STAT. § 656.126(1) (Repl. 1967). However, the benefits of the Oregon Work-
-men's Compensation Act are not available to seamen or any workmen for whom
a rule of liability for injury or death arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment is provided by the laws of the United States. ORE. Rv. STAT. § 656.027(4)
(1953). There has evolved a wide divergence in the interpretation of the limits of
coverage, as to the work connection between injury and employment. One re-
strictive view of the work connection formula requires that the risk be peculiar
to the employment and not common to the public. A more liberal and generally
accepted view suggests that there should be coverage when the risks are connected
to employment, even though they are common risks. See i LARSON § 6.
This principle has been incorporated into the requirements established for
a seaman's recovery under the different remedies available to him. Note 3 supra.
It has always been stressed that a seaman is entitled to maintenance and cure
when injured "in the service of the ship." Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511
(1949); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (19o3). Formerly when a seaman's injury
occurred during a period of relaxation afloat or ashore, he was barred from
recovery. See Meyer v. Dollar S.S. Line, 49 F.2d 1002 (gth Cir. 1931); Wahlgreen
v. Standard Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Smith v. American South
African Line, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Collins v. Dollar S.S. Lines,
23 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). That rule has been repudiated by the Supreme
Court. Aquilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943). Since Aquilar, a number
of cases have awarded maintenance and cure to seamen ill or injured ashore
while in the pursuit of their own relaxation and pleasure. Lawler v. Matson
Navigation Co., io8 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 217 F.2d 645 (9th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 912 (1955). Keefe v. American Pac. S.S. Co., iio F.
1970]
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sions have awarded recovery to seamen who were not only off-the-job
at the time, but also were on land when the injuries occurred. 6
In the recent decision by the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon in Williamson v. Western-Pacific Dredging Corp.,7
the liability of shipowners for off-the-job injuries occurring on shore
has been extended to unprecedented lengths to include land-based
day-workers. A land-based employee was mate on a dredge, assisting
in its operation and maintenance, as well as in its navigation when
it was in movement between various worksites.8 While riding to work
as a passenger in a car driven by a fellow-employee, he was fatally in-
jured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of his
co-employee. 9 The administratrix of his estate brought an action for
both maintenance and cure, and damages for wrongful death 0 under
the Jones Act.
The district court held that because the dredge owner had required
his employees to sleep ashore and had provided travel allowances for
necessary commuting expenses, the decedent was "in the service of the
ship" at the time of the accident so as to permit an award for main-
tenance and cure to the administratrix of his estate." In addition, the
court held that the trip to and from work was within the course of his
employment, thus entitling the plaintiff to recover damages for
wrongful death.
12
Supp. 853 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Clifford v. The Iliamna, io6 F. Supp. 36 (S.D. Cal.
1952). For a seaman to recover under the Jones Act there must be a showing
that a personal injury occurred "in the course of employment." 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1964). Cf. McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 222 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1955). A
similar interpretive liberalization of the scope of activities which should be
compensable has taken place in regard to the Jones Act, since the term "in
the course of employment" has come to mean "in the service of the ship." Braen
v. Pfeifer Oil Tramp. Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959).
OSee Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951); Farrell v. United States,
336 U.S. 511 (1949); Aquilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943); Marceau v.
Great Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 872
(1945).
73o4 F. Supp. 509 (D. Ore. 1969).
'Id. at 512. A dredge may be considered to be a "vessel" insofar as admiralty
jurisdiction is concerned. See Lawrence v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 319 F.2d 8o5
(4th Cir. 1963); Chesser v. General Dredging Co., 15o F. Supp. 592 (S.D. Fla. 1957),
Early v. American Dredging Co., 1o F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
93o4 F. Supp. at 513
"0Id at 511. An injured seaman has both the right to sue for maintenance and
cure and for compensatory damages. They are distinct and separate claims, and
neither is an alternative remedy to the other. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278
U.S. 13o (1928). See generally I NORRIS § 555 (-d ed. 1962).
a3o4 F. Supp. at 515.
'I2 d. at 517-18.
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MAINTENANCE AND CURE
Traditionally, the remedy of maintenance and cure has allowed a
seaman who has become ill, or has been injured in the service of his
ship without willful misbehavior on his part, to receive wages for the
duration of the voyage as well as compensation for sustenance, lodging
and care.13 This remedy was first justified on the basis of the peculiar
characteristics of the life of the seafaring man.14 More recently, the
Supreme Court has reiterated this justification by emphasizing the uni-
queness of the hazards involved, the restrictions on a seaman's liberty,
and the deprivation of the ordinary comforts of life.15 Thus it appears
that the employer's liability is in the nature of an implied contractual
obligation 16 imposed by the general maritime law' 7 as an incident to
an employee's status as a seaman in the employment of his ship.'8
Generally the right to maintenance and cure has been liberally
construed in order to effect certain humanitarian goals. 19 Thus, a sea-
man's injury or illness need not be in any way causally related to his
shipboard duties.2 0 This proposition has evolved from several recent
decisions involving off-the-job injuries incurred by seamen while on
"See generally i NoRms § 537 (2d ed. 1962). The first real statement of the
law came in The Osceola where the court held "[t]hat the vessel and her owners
are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship,
to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long
as the voyage is continued." I89 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). See Farrell v. United States,
336 U.S. 511 (1949). See also GILMORE &: BLACK 253-57.
'Harden v. Gordon, ii F. Cas. 480 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823). Justice
Story advanced as reasons for imposing maintenance and cure the peculiar perils
of life at sea, the helplessness of a seaman stricken by illness, and the need
for compelling the owners of ships to safeguard the health of the seaman en-
trusted to their care. Id. at 483. This classic opinion together with Justice Story's
opinion in Reed v. Canfield, 2o F. Cas. 426 (No. 11,641) (C.C.D. Mass. 1832), have
been said to have established the basic tenets of American rules relating to
maintenance and cure. i NoRRs § 544, 595 n.i9 (2d ed. 1962).
2 Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943). See also The City of
Avalon, 156 F.2d 50o (9th Cir. 1946).
"Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943); Jones v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946); Skolar v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 60 F.2d 893
(2d Cir. 1932); McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., 71 F. Supp. 888 (D.
Mass. 1947).
"De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 667 (1943).
"O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42 (1943).
"Cf. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 729 (1943); Calmar S.S. Corp.
v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938). See also Rodgers v. United States Lines Co.,
189 F.2d 226, 230 (4 th Cir. 1951). Basically the humanitarian aspect of the problem
involves the caring for sick and injured seamen who have no haven other than
their ship. The Quaker City, i F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Pa. 1931).
wSee Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
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shore. In Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co.,21 a seaman was awarded main-
tenance and cure for an injury sustained while returning from a shore
leave. The Court held that seamen on leave are not necessarily on ex-
clusively personal business. Rather, they may be in the service of the
ship, as shore leave may be viewed as a necessary part of a seaman's
employment activities. 22 The primary justification for the extension of
maintenance and cure was the peculiar relation of a seaman to his
ship in that the vessel served not only as his place of employment, but
also as the "framework of his existence."
23
Men cannot live for long cooped up aboard ship, without sub-
stantial impairment of their efficiency, if not also serious danger
to discipline. Relaxation beyond the confines of the ship is
necessary if the work is to go on, more so that it may move
smoothly
2 4
In subsequent cases the Court has proceeded even further in its
expansive interpretation of the meaning of the phrase "in the service
of the ship." 25 Seamen presently may be granted maintenance and
cure if they have been generally answerable to the call of duty at the
time of the illness or injury, regardless of the personal nature of their
activity.26 Moreover, any specific limitations as to the proximity of a
seaman -to his vessel at the time of injury, or as to the manner in which
the injury occurred, have not been forthcoming.27 Thus, these shore-
leave decisions seem to suggest that the remedy of maintenance and
cure has become practically absolute for those maritime workers lead-




2-Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951); Farrell v. United States, 336
U.S. 511 (1949); Central Gulf S.S. Corp. v. Sambula, 405 F.2d 291 (sth Cir. 1968).
nFarrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949); Sundberg v. Washington Fish
& Oyster Co., 138 F.2d Boi (9 th Cir. 1943); Clifford v. The Iliamna, io6 F. Supp.
36 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See also Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945).
A number of maintenance and cure awards have been granted to seamen ill or
injured while ashore in the pursuit of their own relaxation or pleasure. See,
e.g., Keefe v. American Pac. S.S. Co., iio F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (auto-
mobile accident ashore); Nowery v. Smith, 69 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ,
aff'd per curiam, 161 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1947) (seaman injured in barroom fight).
2TLawler v. Matson Navigation Co., io8 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Cal.) aff'd per
curiarm, 217 F.2d 645 (9 th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 912 (1955). In Lawler,
a seaman who was in port on shore leave was injured in an automobile accident
while driving from his home to his ship. He was held to be entitled to maintenance
and cure in that he was generally answerable to the call of duty at the time
of his injury. io8 F. Supp. at 947-
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ing the traditional seaman's life who undergo perils recognized as uni-
que to their occupation.23
The scope of this recovery, however, has not yet been expanded to
include land-based employees of a ship who are injured or become ill
while on shore. Nevertheless, closely analogous decisions have allowed
recovery under an action for maintenance and cure for injuries arising
directly out of shipboard duties.29 In Weiss v. Central Railroad,30 a
seaman who lived at home suffered a disability produced by the physi-
cal exertion of his duties aboard the vessel on which he worked. It
was held that such a day-worker should not be denied the "traditional
privileges of his status" merely because he lived at home, if his dis-
ability was job-related; thus, he was entitled to recover maintenance
and cure.31 Accordingly, it appears that maintenance and cure may be
awarded to a land-based seaman who does not qualify as a mariner in
the traditional sense only if there exists a direct casual link between
his injury or illness and his shipboard duties.
THE JONES AcT
Under the general maritime law there was no liability by the ship-
owner for compensatory damages owing to his seamen-employees for
injuries suffered as a result of the negligence of the owner or of some-
one for whom he was responsible.3 2 However, Section 33, commonly
called the Jones Act,33 was included in the Merchant Marine Act of
192o 3 4 to permit a seaman to maintain an action for damages at law
against his employer for any personal injury suffered in the course of
his employment 35 and due in any part to the negligence of his em-
ployer.3 6
28See GILmOaE S BLACK 261. An exception arises in cases of willful mis-
behavior on the part of the seaman himself. See Watson v. Joshua Hindy Corp.,
142 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1957). Other cases
have noted traditional examples of willful misbehavior. E.g., Aguilar v. Standard
Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 731 (1943).
u"TWeiss v. Central R.R., 235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956); Hudspeth v. Atlantic
F& Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. La. 1967).
3'235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956).
"'Id. at 313.
2See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (19o3). It was held that "the seaman is not
allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the master, or any member
of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were
received by negligence or accident." Id. at 175.
146 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
"Ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. Loo7 (192o).
-46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). Note 5 supra.
MNegligence is the gravamen of a suit under the Jones Act. 2 NoRuus § 686,
at 852 (2d ed. 1962). The Jones Act incorporates the standards of the Federal
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Generally, the scope of a seaman's employment has not been mea-
sured by the standards applied to land-based employment relation-
ships, 37 and the phrase "in the course of employment" has been re-
garded as taking on a broader meaning than in the usual workmen's
compensation context.3 8 Furthermore, that term has been interpreted
as equivalent to the phrase "in the service of the ship" used in main-
tenance and cure cases,39 and has not been restricted to injuries occur-
ring in any particular location.40
Initially, the Jones Act was believed to apply only to maritime torts
and thus was not applied to injuries occurring on shore even though
they may have occurred in the course of employment. 41 This interpreta-
tion has been rejected, however, and it is now recognized that the
right to recovery under the Act should depend not only upon the na-
ture of the seaman's activity at the time of the injury, but also upon
the relationship of that activity to the operation of the vessel.4 2 It has
been clearly recognized, for example, that a seaman may be acting in
the course of his employment when going to or returning from work.
43
Thus, any injury arising out of such travel may be compensable under
the Jones Act if it can be demonstrated that the injury was caused
by the negligence of the officers, agents, or employees of the ship-
owner.
44
Yet in these situations, recovery under the Jones Act was originally
limited to seamen who were injured in close proximity to the ship.45
The scope of the Act was then extended to those seamen who were on
Employers Liability Act which renders an employer liable for the injuries negli-
gently inflicted on its employees by its officers, agents, or employees. 45 U.s.C.
§§ 51-6o (1964). The practical effect of incorporating this section into the maritime
law was to abolish the defense of -the fellow-servant rule. See 2 NoRMs § 656,
at 789 (2d ed. 1962).
See generally i LARSON § 6.io Note 5 supra.
$Note 5 supra.
OBraen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959). See generally GILMORE
& BLAcK 284.
40O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge &: Dock Co., S18 U.S. 36 (1943). It was
recognized that a seaman could recover under the Jones Act for a personal injury
suffered on shore. Id. at 39.
4E.g., O'Brien v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 104 F.2d 148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 3o8
U.S. 555 ('939)-
"Magnolia Towing Co. v. Pace, 378 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
See also Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383 U.S. 262 (1966).
43Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
324 U-S. 872 (1945)-
"Note 36 supra.
"See Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.) cert. denied.
324 U.S. 872 (1945).
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shore leave at the time of the accident.4 6 Subsequently, land-based em-
ployees were given status as seamen in those instances where an injury
was incurred in close proximity to the ship and arose directly from
their shipboard duties.4 7
Jones Act coverage of land-based seamen-employees was recently
extended in Magnolia Towing Co. v. Pace,48 where a pilot was injured
while traveling from his home to a tugboat pursuant to instructions
from his employer. The court stated that the pilot's relationship to
the operation of the vessel, rather than the place where the injury
occurred, was controlling. Implicit in the court's holding is the notion
that an employer is liable for injuries received by a land-based seaman
while traveling to and from work.
THE WILLIAMSON RATIONALE
The district court of Williamson stated that in order for the ad-
ministratrix to recover maintenance and cure, there must have been a
showing that the decedent was both a seaman and that he was acting
in the service of his ship at the time of his injury. Heavy reliance was
placed on recent shore leave decisions holding that a seaman may be
awarded maintenance and cure for an injury incurred while on shore
and on his own business where he was generally answerable to the call
of duty at the time of his injury.4 9 In this context, the court was ap-
parently justified in finding that the trip from the decedent's home to
his ship was in the service of the ship. Indeed, the court in Williamson
pointed out that the decedent was as much answerable to the call of
duty at the time of his injury as were those seamen in the recent shore
leave decisions.0 0 Furthermore, it was noted that the decedent, in re-
turning to his ship by automobile, was better serving his ship than
were the seamen on shore leave who were merely in the pursuit of their
own relaxation and pleasure.50
However, the court in Williamson apparently failed to give suffici-
ent recognition to the original basis of maintenance and cure.52 The
decedent faced few of the unique hazards encountered by the tradi-
"IOd.; see Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Paul
v. United States, ioi F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
'TGianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S. 879, revfg per curiam, 222 F.2d 382 (5 th
Cir. 1955); Weiss v. Central R.R., 235 F.2d 3og (2d Cir. 1956).
"'378 F.2d 12 (5 th Cir. 1967).
"Note 26 supra.
w3o4 F. Supp. at 515.
uld.
Text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
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tional seamen who were "cooped up aboard ship ... ."53 The pursuit
of relaxation and pleasure on land would hardly seem to have been a
necessary part of his employment activities.5 4 A land-based seaman cer-
tainly leads a different mode of life and is not subject to the same
pressures and hazards. Consequently, maintenance and cure generally
has been awarded to land-based seamen only where they were injured
or became ill during their actual shipboard duties, when they were
unquestionably in the service of their ship.55 Thus, in spite of the clear
guidelines established by prior decisions, the court in Williamson
allowed recovery for maintenance and cure where a land-based sea-
man was injured in activity beyond his designated shipboard duties.
At the same time, it might be argued that the court in discussing
maintenace and cure displayed a degree of foresight in holding that a
land-based seaman's travel to and from work was in the service of his
ship. Indeed, the dredgeowner required the decedent and his fellow
employees to live ashore and commute daily.5 6 The employer like-
wise paid their travel expenses in recognition of this additional re-
quirement of their employment.5 7 Thus it appears that the decedent's
trip to and from work may fairly be viewed as a necessary and unique
hazard of his occupation.
Unfortunately, the court in Williamson did not extend its recogni-
tion of the special pertinence of the seaman's travel to and from work
to its discussion of the Jones Act claim. The facts in Williamson
clearly indicated that the two main prerequisites for recovery under
the Act were present, in that the decedent's trip to and from his ship
was vital to the course of his employment, and moreover, his injuries
were brought about by the negligence of a co-employee. 5 The Mag-
nolia case held that a land-based seaman was acting in the course of his
5Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 733 (1943).
51The court's inference that decedent was in effect granted a daily "shore
leave" was never convincingly substantiated. 304 F. Supp. at 515.
wNote 29 supra.
13o4 F. Supp. at 512.
67Id. The court in Williamson concluded that the trip to and from work was
in the boundary of employment because the identification of the travel pay with
the trip was specific and certain. Id. at 518, see Foster v. Massey, 407 F.2d 343
(D.C. Cir. 1968). See i LARSON § 15, for a thorough examination of whether a
trip to and orom work is held to be in the course of employement in a regular
workmen's compensation context. For a recent view of the effect of imputed
approval of an employer through his reimbursement of employees for travel
expenses see Davis. The Effect of Employer Approval on Workmen's Compensa-
tion Decisions-Letting Affected Parties Communicate Standards, 54 CoR.N. L.
REv. 97, 104-06 (1969).
03%4 F. Supp. at 512-13.
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shipboard employment while traveling to and from work.59 Yet the
court in Williamson chose to belabor the distinction between the
direct control exercised by the employer over the transportation in
Magnolia, and the lesser degree of control utilized by the defendant in
Williamson which was manifested in the form of travel pay. 60 Indeed
the court never clearly established that the decedent and his fellow
seamen were fully reimbursed for their actual travel expenses. In light
of the present feeling that greater attention should be accorded the
"course of the employment" concept, 61 it appears that the court's
reliance on an analysis of control was ill-founded.
CONCLUSION
Ostensibly, Williamson has obscured the significance of the tradi-
tional foundation of the remedy of maintenance and cure62 by per-
mitting recovery where a land-based seaman was injured while driv-
ing to work. Prior maintenance and cure decisions in which recovery
was limited to land-based seamen whose injuries arose solely out of
actual shipboard duties,0 3 provide little justification for Williamson's
holding. On the other hand, the court's award of damages for a wrong-
ful death action under the Jones Act would appear to be a logical
and appropriate extension of the liberal construction that has char-
acterized it from the beginning and is consistent with its purposes.0 4
Consequently, the court in Williamson properly awarded both
maintenance and cure and damages under the Jones Act within the
context of an expanding interpretation of the phrase "in the service
of the ship." 60 Indeed, the court recognized that for land-based sea-
men, the trip to and from the ship was a unique hazard. It thus re-
sponded in a manner consistent with the liberal coverage which has
generally been accorded to seamen.
PHILIP C. THOMPSON
r'378 F.2d 12 (sth Cir. 1967).
01o4 F. Supp. at 517-18.
O'See Magnolia Towing Co. v. Pace, 378 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1967); McCall v.
Overseas Tankship Corp., 222 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1955). Marceau v. Great Lakes
Transit Corp., 146 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 872 (1945).
6"Text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
caNote 29 supra.
"The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the Jones Act should be liberally construed in order to
accomplish its remedial and humanitarian purposes. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co.
v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc.,
287 U.S. 367, 375 (1923).
6Note 5 supra. Cf. McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 222 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.
1955).
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